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ABSTRACT 
Emission permits markets have been implemented all over the world but in very different 
conditions than those assumed in the original models developed by Dales (1968) or 
Montgomery (1972). This paper summarizes the assumptions that are violated when 
implementing this policy instrument. Reviewing the most significant literature in the area, we 
analyse the consequences of these violations for the outcome of emission permits markets, 
and derive conclusions about whether the traditional advantages associated with this 
instrument still hold. The major solutions that have been suggested for the identified market 
failures are also described. We find that despite the conflicting results reported in the 
literature, there are some conclusions unanimously accepted. Importantly, we find that the 
characteristics of market institutions are significant determinants of the outcome of these 
markets, which means that these aspects may no longer be treated as a mere detail as within 
the neoclassical approach. In addition, we find that these characteristics have important 
impacts on many other “market failures” identified in this paper. Since these aspects were not 
included in the original models, their predictions differ from the results effectively achieved 
with the implementation of an emissions permit market. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although Montgomery (1972) has rigorously proven that Dales (1968) original model for 
emission permits markets was the most efficient environmental policy instrument, and a vast 
literature has since then been devoted to the description and analysis of its advantages when 
compared to command-and-control instruments, many problems and limitations of this model 
have meanwhile been pointed out. Doubts about the superiority of emission permits markets 
have been particularly raised when environmental policy instruments are compared under the 
actual conditions of their implementation. This means that when one of the hypotheses of the 
model is broken, the results become dubious: the predicted gains from emission permits 
markets may not be achieved and social welfare may be greater under command-and-control 
policies when perfect competition is not the structure of emission permits market as assumed 
originally. 
There has been a long experience with emission permit markets in the USA1, where 
the importance of practical details of their implementation for their functioning and final 
results became clear. Market failures were also identified and concerns about their 
consequences along with actions to prevent them were debated. At the same time, the 
theoretical literature on environmental economics started to change Dales (1968) original 
model in order to analyse the introduction of market failures consequences’. It was also 
proven in this setting that results would change under different market conditions. 
Experimental economics’ investigations also brought into attention some important issues 
concerning the violation of behavioural or structural hypotheses underlying the theoretical set 
up of emission permits market. Limited data on this kind of market make it difficult to use 
field data to evaluate its performance, and, as a result, laboratory data emerge as extremely 
valuable. Laboratory data also allows evaluating new market environments before its effective 
implementation, minimizing the costs of achieving a specific environmental goal, when 
compared, for instance, with field studies. 
The main objective of this paper is to summarize and present a critical review of the 
literature that focus on the importance of practical details for emission permits market 
implementation, market failures and their consequences. The paper is organized in six 
sections, each concerning a different aspect of emission permits market. The final section 
concludes, summarizing the main findings of the paper. 
 
                                                 
1
 The USA first experiences with this kind of instrument occurred before the nineties: EPA Emissions Trading 
Program (1974- ); RECLAIM (1994- ); Lead Phasedown (1979-1987); Acid Rain Program (1992- ); CFC 
Phasedown (1989 - 1995); Effluent Trading (1983- ). See Solomon (1999, p. 377). 
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2. MARKET INSTITUTION 
Potential buyers or sellers of any good use some form of market organization to carry out 
their transactions. The rules that govern the way transactions occur characterize a specific 
market institution. These rules include many details, such as the indication of which agent 
starts the offers in the market, its timing and order, the way contracts are announced and 
closed, and what kind of information is available at any moment in the market. Along with 
agents’ behaviour, these rules contain information that will lead to a specific market outcome. 
Neoclassical economics tends to minimize these issues, and excludes practical details 
from its models. However, empirical results from various markets have established the need 
to understand the consequences of different market institutions. What is often referred to as 
New Institution Economics (NIE), arises as an answer to the criticisms to the traditional 
economic models highlighting precisely the importance of market institutions for the final 
results attained. Solomon (1999), one of the economists of this economic stream, refers that 
only recently NIE reasoning has been applied to the specific case of environmental 
economics. In his paper, Solomon (1999) reviews some of the emission permits markets 
already in place, mainly in the USA, focusing on its institutional structures and processes. His 
goal was to identify the advantages and disadvantages of those market institutions in order to 
formulate recommendations for future programs, and to understand how it could influence 
some market failures like transaction costs, market power or uncertainty. 
Solomon’s work is in line with many other previous empirical studies (for example, 
Hahn (1989) or Atkinson and Tietenberg (1991)) concerning the USA emission permits 
markets, which demonstrate that market institutions matter and should not be treated as small 
details. These studies analyse specific proposals of the American government for the 
implementation of emission permits markets, comparing predicted results with effective ones 
and trying to explain the observed differences. Their common conclusion is that due to the 
transaction rules imposed to companies in the market, characterized by too many restrictions, 
the number of transactions was smaller than predicted, i.e, smaller than the optimal level. 
The characteristics of market institutions have also been the subject of theoretical 
studies. Cason (1993), for example, modelled the specific case of the EPA’s proposal for SO2 
emission trading market focusing on the auction rules imposed to emission permits 
transactions. Those rules included discriminative emission permits price and not a unique 
price in the market – each buyer would pay his bid price to the seller who asked the smaller 
value. Cason (1993) has shown that this particular rule is an incentive for distorted offers: 
sellers under estimate the true costs of pollution control in order to win the best bids in the 
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market. Cason (1993) concludes that the EPA choice for the auction rules in this market 
introduce market price bias and reduce its efficiency and advantages. 
Montgomery (1972) formally proved the superiority of this environmental policy 
instrument compared to any other, whatever the initial allocation of permits (with different 
results concerning “equity” only). However, as the discussion in section 3 will show, this 
characteristic (initial allocation of permits) of the market institution is also an important 
determinant of the final emission permits market outcome, in particular when some of the 
hypotheses of the model are violated. Even when this is not the case, many authors defend the 
auctioning of emission permits instead of grandfathering as an initial method for its 
allocation. 
Cramton and Kerr (2002) systematically point out arguments in favour of auctions as a 
method for the initial allocation of emission permits. First, they refer to the double dividend 
argument, which consists on the reuse of the auction revenues to reduce previous existing 
distortions such as those caused by other taxes. In this way, the environmental objective is 
achieved while correcting an existing market distortion. Secondly, these authors consider that 
auctions provide greater incentives to technological innovation, thereby reducing marginal 
abatement costs and the equilibrium price of emission permits. The logic is that when titles 
are grandfathered firms have no incentives to reduce their costs of abatement and emission 
permits prices: since firms do not have to buy the titles because they are offered under 
grandfathering, their price is not as important as it would if the firms had to enter in an 
auction for them. Thirdly, the authors argue that debates and political discussions are shorter 
and easier when auctions are chosen to initially allocate emission permits. There is no need to 
spend much time trying to get support from the different involved parties deciding how to 
distribute titles to firms, a time that is spent when grandfathering is the method for the initial 
allocation. Because this decision has important “equity” implications, it might even become a 
barrier to the implementation of this kind of program. While time and resources are spent 
because the market takes time to start functioning when grandfathering is the option adopted, 
auctioning needs only a clear specifications concerning the use of the revenues produced to 
get the necessary political support2. Finally, and related to the third point, Cramton and Kerr 
(2002) consider that auctions convey more flexibility to the abatement costs distribution. 
                                                 
2
 Hahn et al. (1982) proposal for a Revenue Neutral Auction (RNA) as a method for emission permits 
distribution intended, precisely, to solve the problem of political acceptance and support for the implementation 
of this kind of program. They suggested to grandfather emission titles and then ask firms to give back the titles 
to be auctioned by the regulatory entity. Each firm would then enter the market as a buyer, and the only seller 
would be the regulator. A particular aspect of Hahn et al. (1982) auction concerns the distribution of its 
revenues: each agent would receive the equivalent to the value of the titles initially received (given back to the 
regulator afterwards). So, those who bought more titles than those initially allocated make a positive payment to 
the regulator and those who bought less receive a liquid payment.  
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Equity is easily achievable by the auctioning of emission permits because there is more 
flexibility for the compensation of affected agents. 
Kling and Zhao (2000) also studied the implications of different methods for the initial 
allocation of emission permits. These authors show that in the long run, the method chosen 
will have consequences not only on equity, as originally assumed, but also in the efficiency of 
the market. In their model, Kling and Zhao (2000) consider the case of global and local 
pollutants and conclude that the former should be auctioned, but some of the latter should be 
grandfathered. 
Currently, the method for the initial allocation of emission permits is an issue 
generating an increasing amount of research. Even if this is an open field for future 
investigations, it seems clear that it represents one particular aspect of the functioning rules of 
the market defined by regulators that has important consequences on the market final 
outcome. This issue should therefore deserve considerable attention by politicians and 
economists so that emission permits markets may bring the most efficient results while 
accomplishing a specific environmental objective. 
Another important characteristic of the market implemented for emission permits 
transaction relates to the choice between a cap-and-trade and a baseline-and-credit system. It 
was originally argued that these were equivalent schemes if the baseline established in the 
latter was the same as the total emission permits issued in the former. But while a vast 
literature emerged on the implementation of this instrument as a cap-and-trade system, almost 
none dealt with the alternative baseline-and-credit system. As some of the mechanisms 
predicted by the Kyoto Protocol are baseline-and-credit systems - CDM (Clean Development 
Mechanism) and JI (Joint Implementation)-, a growing interest on this type of system has 
recently emerged, especially because so little has been written and is known about it. 
Performance predictions for credits market, the link between these two mechanisms, and an 
international market for emission permits transaction are questions that deserve further 
scrutiny. Muller (1999), for example, studies these questions focusing on the properties of 
these two systems and the consequences of their interaction. This author concludes that cap-
and-trade and baseline-and-credit are equivalent systems if the baseline is a fixed quantity but 
not if it is a baseline emissions ratio times current output. He also concludes that the 
combination of these two systems should not be allowed because it loosens up the quantity 
emissions cap on the cap-and-trade system. In the long run, the quantity constrain on 
emissions will even disappear with the combination of these two types of programs for 
emissions trading. This conclusion certainly requires further enquiry as it means that there is 
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the danger that the environmental goal established by the Kyoto Protocol signatories 
(reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions) may not be achieved. 
The objective of the experimental work of Buckley (2004) and Buckley et al. (2005a, 
b) consists precisely in studying the characteristics of cap-and-trade and baseline-and-credit 
programs, and test the theoretical predictions about their performance. Although much 
experimental work exists on emission trading markets considering a cap-and-trade system, 
these are the first experiments focusing on the baseline-and-credit version. They analysed 
short and long run theoretical predictions about the behaviour of these plans and concluded, 
as predicted, that in the short run they are equivalents but in the long run the baseline-and-
credit program results on higher production and emissions than the cap-and-trade version. 
However, to our knowledge, there is no experimental work analysing a different 
question: the consequences of those systems connection. And, as we referred above, this is an 
essential question considering the international agreements for greenhouse gas reductions. 
Therefore, this stands as an important research area for the future. 
Several experimental studies exist focusing on other aspects of the market institutions 
chosen for the implementation of emission permits markets. Cason (1995), Cason et al. 
(1996) and Franciosi et al. (1999), for example, developed laboratory experiments to study 
the consequences of EPA’s specific choice for SO2 emission trading. These experiments 
tested Cason (1993) conclusions (as above summarized), and compared the results achieved 
with EPA’s market institution with those resulting from uniform price auctions. All these 
experiments concluded that Cason (1993) theoretical predictions were correct since the 
transaction rules imposed by EPA cause price bias and reduced efficiency on the market due 
to the strategic behaviour of the agents. 
The experimental work by Franciosi et al. (1993) tested the Revenue Neutral Auction 
(RNA) proposed by Hahn et al. (1982) checking whether the characteristics of this market 
institution would change final results, as it was similar to a single price auction except for the 
auction revenues redistribution. The authors concluded that this additional characteristic does 
not change usual behaviour in the market, corroborating Hahn et al. (1982) prediction of 
superiority of this kind of auction. 
The objective of the experiments conducted by Cason et al. (1998) and Ishikida et al. 
(2000) was also to test the consequences of different market institutions for the RECLAIM 
program. Cason et al. (1998) compared the proposed electronic bulletin board institution with 
the double auction, and Ishikida et al. (2000) compared a uniform price double auction and a 
combined value call market. Although these authors studied different market institutions, and 
used different experimental designs, their relevant conclusion for our purposes was that the 
 7
efficiency of the specific emission permits program will vary depending on the characteristics 
of those market institutions. 
The experiments conducted by Mestelman et al. (1999) and Cason et al. (1999) also 
had the objective of testing specific emission permits markets proposals. They focused on a 
specific characteristic of this markets related with the intertemporal transaction of these titles, 
a subject analysed in section 5 below. Once again, different rules imposed by the regulator 
proved to influence the final outcome of the emission permits market. 
In summary, even using different methodologies or focusing on different aspects of 
the market institution chosen for the implementation of a program for emission permits 
transaction, all the studies reviewed here lead us to the same conclusion: institutions do 
matter for the efficiency of this policy instrument. In most cases, institutional details are 
responsible for different results from the anticipated ones. Thus, economists should not 
consider them a minor detail under the responsibility of governmental authorities, but engage 
in systematic research of these issues so as to provide specific guidance for policy decision 
makers. 
The next sections will again stress the importance of the market institution chosen for 
the implementation of an emission permits program. Depending on this choice, some market 
failures will have more or less impact on the efficiency of the market. This means that the 
exercise of market power, the transaction costs imposed or the uncertainty felt by agents in 
the market are influenced by the market institution chosen. In addition, as will become 
apparent, these characteristics are also important for the final market outcomes concerning the 
incentives to innovation or the compliance with the limits imposed. 
 
3. TRANSACTION COSTS  
Although the original models for emission permits market did not consider the importance of 
transaction costs, empirical evidence showed it differently. Hahn (1989) and Atkinson and 
Tietenberg (1991) identified transaction costs, caused by market rules imposed by EPA, as a 
major responsible for less than optimal volume of traded SO2 permits and consequently less 
efficiency gains than predicted. It was clear that regulators could influence the magnitude of 
transaction costs firms had to bear through the conception of the market institution to be 
implemented. 
Foster and Hahn (1995) study also supports these conclusions. Their detailed analysis 
of emission permits trading in Los Angeles basin demonstrated that the big price dispersion 
and the different than expected equilibrium pattern were due to large transactions cost. These 
were, in turn, a consequence of the regulatory details of the implemented market. 
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As the existence of transaction costs and their consequence on the efficiency of 
emission permits markets became a consensual reality, increasing attention was devoted to it. 
Woerdman (2001), for example, evaluates and compares existing transaction costs for each of 
the mechanisms included in the Kyoto Protocol. Woerdman (2001) also stresses that an 
important contribution for the efficiency of an international climatic policy would be to find 
out ways to reduce transaction costs, as no doubt exists that all three mechanisms will entail 
such costs.  
A seminal work in this area is Stavins (1995) model, which explicitly includes the 
transaction costs of abatement firms cost functions. With this modification of Montgomery’s 
model, Stavins (1995) demonstrates that the transaction costs reduce the volume of emission 
permits trading, which becomes less than optimal. Transaction costs increase abatement costs 
because of emission trading reduction and add up to total costs of control. Stavins (1995) 
considers, however, that the distortions caused by the existence of transaction costs may be 
reduced if a big number of firms exist in the market because more information will be 
produced in the market, and it will be easier for firms to find a potential partner for trade. 
Stavins (1995) also analysed the impact of the initial allocation of emission permits on the 
market outcome when transaction costs exist. His conclusion depends on the specific 
transaction costs function. If this function is constant, the usual results of economic theory 
hold true (initial allocation of permits only impacts equity), but if it is increasing or 
decreasing, the efficiency of the market is also affected. According to Stavins (1995) this 
brings an additional argument in favour of auctions of emission permits as an initial allocation 
method. In order to avoid the need for many transactions in the market, initial allocations 
should be as close as possible to the efficient ones, and only emission permits auctions 
overcome the regulator’s incomplete information problem. The author defends that the 
conception of these environmental programs should provide the maximum information as 
possible in order to reduce to the minimum the transaction costs for its acquisition. 
Montero (1997) develops the Stavins’ model adding some different aspects such as 
uncertainty about the regulator emission permits transaction’s approval (a characteristic of 
some of the market institutions implemented for emissions transactions in the USA), and the 
possibility of discontinuities in the marginal abatement cost curves. Montero (1997)’s model 
focus on the impact of significant changes on transaction costs (and not marginal, as in 
Stavins’ model), on uncertainty, and on initial allocation of permits, to the equilibrium market 
outcome. Montero’s conclusions are similar to those of Stavins: transaction costs reduce 
social welfare of the system for the same reasons pointed out by Stavins. However, Montero 
demonstrates that emission permits markets are, even in the presence of transaction costs and 
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uncertainty, more efficient than command-and-control policy instruments since the total 
expected abatement costs of pollution are inferior. Thus, even if the potential efficiency gains 
are smaller than originally predicted, the choice of this instrument is still recommended. 
Montero concludes also that the initial allocation of emission permits influences market 
efficiency when transaction costs and uncertainty are present. Contrary to Stavins’ 
conclusion, however, Montero points out that this is true even in the presence of constant 
marginal abatement costs and certainty. Finally, Montero recommends simplification of 
administrative proceedings, and clear legal directives concerning the approval processes for 
transactions in the market in order to reduce transaction costs and uncertainty. 
Using the experimental methodology, Cason and Gangadharan (2003) also studied the 
impact of transaction costs on emission permits markets efficiency outcome. They focused on 
different transaction costs functions and their interaction with different emission permits 
initial allocation methods to evaluate the impact on total abatement costs, thereby testing 
Stavins (1995)’s conclusions. Their results show that the equilibrium of emission permits 
markets is affected by the existence of transaction costs: the volume of emission permits 
transactions is smaller in the presence of transaction costs, which means that efficiency and 
welfare is reduced. Also consistent with Stavins (1995) predictions, Cason and Gangadharan 
(2003) find that the final market outcome depends on marginal transaction costs functions and 
initial permits allocation. As predicted, if marginal transaction costs are constant, the initial 
permits allocation has no influence on the final market outcome. However, if those costs are 
increasing or decreasing, their impact on the market outcome depends on whether the initial 
allocation of permits is closer to or more distant from the optimal level. 
Cason and Gangadharan (2003) corroborate Stavins’ recommendations for regulators 
to first evaluate how the imposed market rules affect the transaction costs that firms must bear 
and only then choose the initial emission permits allocation rules according to the behaviour 
of those cost functions.  
Summing up, the original efficiency predictions for emission permits markets are 
affected by transaction costs. This threat, however, depends on the type of cost functions 
involved and on the initial permits allocation. Nevertheless, it is clear that this constitutes an 
important aspect to take into consideration when conceiving a program for the transaction of 
emission permits. 
 
4. MARKET POWER 
Data from the first emission permits markets brought in to light another problem not predicted 
by Dales (1968) or Montgomery (1972) models: market power. This was one characteristic of 
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the market that violated one of the key hypotheses of the original model: perfect competition. 
The violation of this hypothesis raised the question of whether the efficiency gains associated 
to emission permits transactions would still hold. 
Hahn (1984), Tietenberg (1985) and Misiolek and Elder (1989) theoretical works, for 
example, recognize this problem and try to evaluate its consequences on the advantages of 
this environmental policy instrument. Many other studies on this matter emerged since then, 
namely because the possible exercise of market power became a prominent issue in the 
international political agenda given the threat posed by Russia’s monopolistic behaviour to 
the international market for emission permits transactions. 
Hahn (1984) was the first to formally demonstrate that the properties and advantages 
of emission permits markets would not hold in the presence of market power. He proved that 
under market power emission permits transactions would not minimize total abatement costs, 
and the final result was dependent on its initial allocation. Much like Stavins’ conclusions 
concerning the presence of transaction costs in emission permits markets, Hahn also 
contradicts the original model’s prediction that the initial allocation only influences equity. In 
fact, Hahn shows that allowing for the possibility of market power, its exercise will be greater 
the farther the emission permits initial allocation is from the efficient one. Thus, not only 
equity but also efficiency is affected by political decisions. Hahn’s suggestion for this market 
failure is for regulators to distribute emission permits the closest possible to the efficient level 
so that the firm with market power will not use them because it will decide not to enter the 
market. Although this solves the inefficiency problem caused by market power, it causes this 
environmental policy instrument to suffer from the same regulator’s imperfect information 
difficulty about firms’ true marginal abatement costs as other command-and-control 
instruments. This means that the advantage of less information requirements for the regulator 
of emission permits markets disappears. 
Tietenberg (1985), although recognizing that market power exercise diminishes 
emission permits market efficiency, does not consider it a very serious problem. Even with 
market power, Tietenberg (1985) considers emission permits transaction still a better solution 
than the command-and-control ones, achieving a certain environmental objective at a smaller 
cost. Moreover, environmental quality is not affected by market power as the limit (cap) on 
emissions is the same, the difference on final results being on higher emission permits price 
and, consequently, higher abatement costs. For this reason, Tietenberg (1985) undervalues 
Hahn’s (1984) results and conclusions. 
Misiolek and Elder (1989) model evaluates a different type of problem concerning 
imperfect competition in emission permits market. These authors study strategic market 
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power and not simple market power, as we implicitly have been referring to. They focus on 
firms’ capacity of strategic manipulation of emission permits in order to raise its rival’s 
production costs rather than to minimize its own total abatement costs – simple market power. 
The authors emphasize that this is only possible when firms compete in the same industry, 
and the dominant firm believes it is able to influence other companies’ costs through this type 
of manipulation, increasing its market power inside the industry. Misiolek and Elder (1989) 
consider a dominant price-maker firm in the product market and a competitive price-taker 
fringe of small firms. They also consider that emission permits prices are sensitive to the 
dominant firm orders in the market, which means that this firm determines the product price 
and its rival costs through emission permits. Using a different approach than previous studies, 
these authors also reach different conclusions. Strategic trade of permits might be an effective 
way to increase the dominant firm’s market share and profits, always withholding more 
emissions permit than would be possible in any other circumstance. Misiolek and Elder 
(1989) conclude that strategic behaviour in emission permits markets may lead to such 
efficiency reduction that other traditional forms of regulation may become less costly, which 
is completely contrary to the original economic theory on this matter. Their conclusions are 
valuable for policy makers in the sense they alert to the need of different answers from 
regulatory authorities to these two different types of market power manipulation--simple and 
strategic. 
Many experimental studies have bee conducted in order to test the true dimension of 
the market power problem. These studies also relate the market power problem to the type of 
market institution chosen by the regulator for emission permits transaction, in particular to the 
double auction institution though to be robust to imperfect competition conditions. Smith 
(1981), Smith and Williams (1989), Holt et al. (1986), Davis and Williams (1991) and 
Sbriglia et al. (1996) are some examples of experimental studies that tested the performance 
of different market institutions in the presence of a dominant firm in the product market. They 
conclude that the dominant firm’s capacity to exercise market power depended on market 
institutions characteristics, and show that double auctions are capable of preventing its 
exercise. However, this result does not appear so consensual for the specific case of emissions 
trading markets. 
Brown-Kruse et al. (1995) used the experimental methodology to test both simple and 
strategic market power implications on the emission permits market. They used a double 
auction institution and a sequential decision structure, considering first the decisions 
concerning the transactions on the emission permits market, and subsequently the decisions 
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about production on the product market3. The environment created by Brown-Kruse et al. also 
assumed information asymmetry between firms, as the dominant firm knew fringe costs and 
productive capacity and fringe firms only knew their own costs. The results of these 
experiments show that the impact on emission permits market outcomes is not substantial in 
the case of simple market power. With the parameters used in these experiments, most of the 
potential efficiency gains were realized even in the presence of this market failure. 
However, when strategic manipulation is included the results are quite negative, even 
inferior to those of command-and-control, which is a worrying conclusion that corroborates 
Misiolek’s et al. (1989) exclusionary theory. Brown-Kruse et al. (1995) also concluded that 
the emission permits initial distribution could influence this market’s final outcome when 
market power is present. If a monopolist firm is able to exercise strategic market power, all of 
the emission permits should be initially allocated to fringe firms so that they impede the 
dominant firm to exclude them from the product market. Notice that when grandfathering is 
the initial allocation method chosen for emission permits distribution, and these are assigned 
mainly to the big firms in the market, there is a real danger that they will exclude rival firms 
from the market or potential new entrants. Since this is the most common method being used 
for the initial allocation of permits, the need for detailed studies considering the structure of 
the product market involved is obvious before adopting such program. 
The experimental results of Brown-Kruse et al. (1995) bring a solution proposal for 
the strategic market power problem similar to that of Hahn’s (1984) for simple market power. 
Thus, this experiment reinforces emission permits initial distribution importance for the 
efficiency of this market, which would be negligible if the perfect competition assumption of 
the original model was in fact the structure of the market. In addition, Brown-Kruse et al. 
(1995) results, contrary to precedent experiments on the product market, showed that the 
double auction institution was not capable of preventing the exercise of market power in 
emission permits markets. 
Godby (1996) experiments corroborate Brown-Kruse et al. (1995)’s conclusions. First, 
the use of a double auction was not able to prevent the exercise of market power; second, 
strategic market power seriously hits the efficiency of the system making it inferior even to 
the command-and-control reference; third, the initial allocation of permits has influence on 
the final outcome of the market, specially when firms are vertically integrated. This last result 
is particularly important since the option to grandfather the permits tends to be politically 
more attractive.  
                                                 
3
 This structure included a context of uncertainty in the experiment. But we will focus on this particular aspect 
on the next section of our paper. 
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Godby’s (1999) study aimed to evaluate the effect of the existence of a dominant firm 
on the potential benefits of an emission permit market and to the performance of double 
auctions institutions in these circumstances. His experimental work tested two specific 
characteristics of Smith’s (1981) experiments on the product market that could be responsible 
for the results obtained: the dimension of the fringe and the parameters used. Smith (1981) 
concluded that the market equilibrium was closer to the competitive, even with a dominant 
firm in the market, when using a double auction institution, due to tacit collusive behaviour 
among the firms in the competitive fringe. Godby (1999) tests the robustness of Smith’s 
results with respect to the number of firms in the fringe and their parameters (not allowing 
some firms to enter the market when the dominant firms exercised its power). Additionally, 
Godby introduced some asymmetry in the firms’ information regarding costs.  
The results obtained with these experiments showed that double auctions were not able 
to prevent market power exercise in the emission permits market, as the equilibrium prices 
were always closer to the monopoly prediction than to the competitive one. Even though, 
Godby (1999) concluded that most of the potential efficiency gains of this policy instrument 
were still achieved we cannot ignore the effects of market power since as equilibrium 
(monopolist or monopsonist) prices in the market did not reveal true marginal abatement 
costs, this market would not be able to induce the appropriate level of technological 
innovation in abatement technologies.  
Muller et al. (2002) also tested the robustness of double auctions institution to prevent 
market power exercise in emission permits markets. They made some changes to the design 
of the previous experiments in order to allow a stronger comparison between a competitive 
and a monopolistic market structure: subjects participated, during the same session, in the two 
market structures alternatively. They found that the double auction institution rules were not 
sufficient to prevent the exercise of market power however the efficiency of the market was 
not seriously affected. The authors consider that there is a question that remains to be 
answered: which (if any) are the emissions permits market particular characteristics that 
explain the different results obtained with these experiments for emission permits market 
when compared with similar circumstances in the product market.   
Carlén (2002) considered a different sequence in firms’ decision. Instead of deciding 
first the behaviour in the permits market and then in the product market, Carlén (2002) argue 
that in most real world applications, firms decide their production plans before possessing the 
necessary emission permits. Carlén (2002) considers a wrong assumption to treat emission 
titles as a physic input, vital to production, so tested strategic market power manipulation 
under conditions he considered closer to the real one. In this experiments the context was 
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revealed to the participants, contrarily to what usually happens in this kind of experiences. 
Double auction was the market institution chosen for both the emission permits and the 
product market. 
Carlén (2002) experiments results rejected Misiolek et al. (1989) strategic 
manipulation theory, as equilibrium prices and quantities were close to the competitive levels 
and not to the monopolistic ones. Results also showed that emission permits market was quite 
competitive but the dominant firm manipulated product market, reducing its offers. In this last 
case, the double auction institution was not enough to eliminate market power exercise as 
Smith (1981), Smith and Williams (1989), Holt et al. (1986), Davis and Williams (1991) and 
Sbriglia et al. (1996) argued. 
The divergence between Carlén (2002) and Brown-Kruse et al. (1995) conclusions 
might be explained by differences in the design and parameters of the experiments. Which 
implies that some caution must be taken in generalising the results of any study. 
Carlén (2003) experimental work studied a simple market power manipulation (and 
not strategic, as in 2002) for the specific case of an international emission permits market, 
using a double auction. The objective was to test the politicians’ concerns about the 
possibility of exercise of market power in the greenhouse gas international market. With 
several modifications on the typical design of this type of experiments, Carlén (2003) aimed 
to make his lab experiment the closest possible to the one that would be the real international 
market for emission permits.  
Carlén (2003) results were close to the competitive levels, so the emission permits 
market achieved high efficiency levels. As this experiment included most of real international 
emissions trading characteristics, it sheds some doubts on the validity of the concerns about 
reduced efficiency due to the existence of dominant firms in the international market. His 
conclusion indicates that this should not be a reason for concern, although Carlén (2003) 
himself points out the need for further experiments to test validity of these results, because of 
the reduced number of independent observations produced.  
Cason et al. (2003) also developed some experiments to test the problem of the 
exercise of simple power market, and Hahn’s (1984) proposals. The market institution chosen 
to the laboratory trades was again a double auction, to test if, as traditionally pointed out, this 
was robust to imperfect competition. The results of these experiments were closer to the 
competitive equilibrium values than to the monopolist ones therefore Cason et al. (2003) 
conclude that the double auction was robust to market power also for the specific case of 
emission permits markets, as previous experiments like Smith’s (1981), for example, have 
concluded for the product market. This, however, is an opposite conclusion to Godby’s (1999) 
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or Muller’s et al. (2002) experiments, for instance. This contradiction should, therefore, be 
further investigated. 
On the other hand, Cason’s et al. (2003) results did not support Hahn’s (1984) 
recommendation about initial allocation of permits since market performance was not 
significantly affected by emission permits initial allocation. So, accordingly to Cason’s et al. 
(2003) the original property of emission permits markets would still hold: initial allocation of 
permits influences only the equity but not the efficiency of the market.  
In summary, it seems clear that the existence of a dominant firm in an emission 
permits market is not irrelevant for its final outcomes. It may have bigger or smaller influence 
on the efficiency of the market, whether we are dealing with exclusionary or simple market 
power, respectively. But, as we have seen, various studies on this matter found different 
conclusions so further investigation is necessary. Some proposals have also been made and 
tested as a solution for this market failure but again in this respect no general consensus 
exists. 
This is, however, one aspect that threats the advantages originally attributed to 
emission permits markets and obviously it should not be ignored. Even if it does not seriously 
affect static efficiency (in the case of simple manipulation), it always changes the dynamic 
efficiency of the market. When market power is present, equilibrium market prices do not 
reflect true marginal abatement costs hence they do not accomplish one of their main tasks. 
Consequently, incentives to innovation on abatement technologies are not at the appropriate 
level, dropping one of the major advantages of this instrument comparatively to those of 
command-and-control4. For this reason, when conceiving and effectively implementing an 
emissions permits market program, regulators should carefully analyse the structure of the 
market being created and decide on the method to perform the initial allocation of permits in 
accordance with the other characteristics of the market.  
 
5. UNCERTAINTY   
Dales’s (1968) proposal for an emission permits market assumed perfect competition among 
the participants. One condition for perfect competition is the existence of perfect information.  
However this condition is rarely, if ever, verified in real world applications. In this section we 
examine the implications of imperfect information on market outcomes. Imperfect 
information affects market outcomes by creating uncertainty for all the agents involved in the 
                                                 
4
 We will treat about incentives to innovation of emission permits markets on the seventh section of this paper. 
This is an original advantage of this environmental policy instrument over all the others that have been 
questioned not only when market power is present. 
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market, including environmental regulators and regulated firms. We start the analysis by 
identifying the different types of uncertainty and how they impact market participants.  
Regulators’ uncertainty regards the quantity/quality of environmental damages as well 
as the social benefits of pollution abatement and the emissions social marginal abatement 
costs. As referred by Laffont and Tirole (1996), future scientific discoveries might show that 
environmental damages are much higher or much smaller than expected. This uncertainty is 
present when regulators must decide the amount of emission permits to put in the market 
(decide the value of the cap). Additionally, uncertainty affects the value of the change in the 
social welfare that would result from a different quantity if in the future new scientific 
information is revealed. However, given the uncertainty regarding the quantity or extent of 
the environmental damages, regulators set the environmental objective exogenously. The lack 
of scientific certainty regarding the physical impacts of human actions on the environment 
explains the difficulty in finding studies evaluating the environmental efficiency of an 
environmental policy. The methodology to evaluate efficiency of environmental policies is 
the cost-benefit analysis, which consists in valuing the costs of the policy and its benefits, and 
then compares both numbers. The problem arises because there is no correct number for the 
benefits’ value given the scientific uncertainty regarding the environmental effects. This 
renders cost-benefit analysis an improper methodology to give a clean and unique answer to 
the question of efficiency. On the other hand, it is possible to evaluate the policy effectiveness 
by determining the best way to achieve a certain environmental goal at the least cost possible. 
Although emission permits market is commonly referred as the most efficient environmental 
instrument, rigorously when referring to the practical applications it should be said it is the 
most effective one, in other words, it achieves a certain environmental objective at the least 
possible cost5. This is, in fact, the question we consider in this paper, ignoring the imperfect 
information problem faced by the regulator when determining the total level of emission 
permits to allocate.  
Regulator’s imperfect information is also about firms’ true marginal abatement costs. 
However, this does not constitute a problem in a tradable emission permits regime. Even if 
the initial allocation of emission permits is not the most efficient one, transactions in the 
market will originate an efficient equilibrium level. This constitutes an advantage of this 
policy instrument compared with command-and-control ones. 
Uncertainty also exists on the regulated firms’ side. Firms may have a deficient 
knowledge of its own true pollution abatement level at the end of the control period, and its 
curve of marginal abatement costs. As demand for emission permits depends on firms’ 
                                                 
5
 However, we will use efficiency term to mean the same, as all environmental economics literature does. 
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pollutant discharges, and these depend on firms’ technological choices and volume of 
production, neither perfectly controlled, then the exact amount of required emission permits to 
comply with the legal limits will also be uncertain. This is the type of uncertainty most 
commonly addressed in the literature. 
Carlson and Sholtz (1994) study precisely the type of uncertainty just mentioned, its 
consequences and possible solutions. The authors argue that when firms are risk averse and 
do not know exactly the number of permits required for the control period, they tend to hoard 
some permits to face eventual needs to prevent being short on permits and be penalized by the 
control agency. This may cause some efficiency losses if at the end of the control period those 
permits are not necessary. In some applications a reconciliation market exist for firms to clear 
their positions at the end of the control period. However, as Carlson and Sholtz (1994) point 
out, regulated firms’ activity tends to be correlated among them, which increases the 
probability of all firms being short or long, at the same time. A greater volatility of emission 
permits’ prices by the end of the control period is therefore a natural consequence of this type 
of uncertainty. As prices volatility generates economic losses Carlson et al. (1994) make 
some suggestions for changing of the original model of emission permits market, thus 
developing a new market institution. 
Carlson and Sholtz (1994) consider several proposals and find that the creation of 
permits with different emission and expiration dates (alternate emission permits) is the more 
effective. The idea is to allow more flexibility for market participants to react to random 
events such us changes in demand and production volume. Permits with different emission 
and expiration allow smoother reactions by firms to unpredicted emissions changes and 
consequently regulators are not faced with periods of huge pollution and consequently 
violation of environmental limits. Additionally, prices emission titles would reflect more 
closely firms’ marginal abatement costs, a necessary condition for economic efficiency in the 
market6.  
Porter (1993) used experiments to test whether the uncertainty regarding firms’ exact 
level of emissions was the cause of the effectiveness loss and if the solution proposed by 
Carlson and Sholtz (1994) just discussed solved the above-mentioned problems. The results 
of these experiments confirm the increased volatility of emission permits prices in the 
presence of uncertainty. However, the volatility is significantly reduced with alternate 
emission permits, in other words, price fluctuations were smoother and no price crashes were 
registered. Porter (1993) found that participants achieved higher profits with alternate 
                                                 
6
 However, Carlson and Sholtz (1994) consider these alternate emission permit titles should be used together 
with the reconciliation market, and not to be a substitute. 
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emission permits than with uniform titles, which indicates that this change in the market 
institution brought an increase in efficiency. Therefore, the creation of alternate emission 
permits seems to contribute to effectively solve the problem.  
Other solution pointed in economic literature for the price volatility problem caused by 
uncertainty respects to the possibility of using emission permits beyond their original 
expiration date. This is usually named as banking of emission permits and consists of 
allowing firms to use permits not used in previous periods, in order to satisfy an unexpected 
demand of subsequent periods. Bankable permits are tradable through time rather than only 
through space7.  
Although one disadvantage of this proposal is a decrease in regulators’ ability to 
control pollutant emissions distribution over the time, several studies have analysed possible 
positive consequences of this intertemporal use of emission permits.  
Theoretical studies about the properties of emissions trading markets with banking 
(and borrowing8) appeared after policymakers introduced them in real world applications9. 
Rubin (1996) analyses firms’ problem of minimizing abatement costs over time by 
heterogeneous regulated firms that periodically receive emission permits with indefinite 
horizon. Rubin’s (1996) continuous model achieved a pattern for intertemporal pollutant 
emissions trading important not only for what concerns cost minimization but also for the 
knowledge about its impact on environmental damages. He concluded, that when banking is 
allowed and environmental standards become more stringent, total present environmental 
damages are reduced. However when borrowing is allowed the results are the reverse. 
Rubin’s (1996) recommendation, is to include the possibility of intertemporal substitution in 
emission permits markets, since it gives firms a bigger flexibility to adjust their emissions 
flow, which reduces their abatement costs. 
Rubin’s (1996) work contributed to a better knowledge of the efficiency properties of 
emission permits markets when banking and borrowing is allowed. However various 
subsequent studies introduced several changes to his model10. These are described in detail 
bellow. 
                                                 
7
 Although bankable permits are the most common solution suggested for uncertainty problems, other 
developments are referred, such as the introduction of futures and options. For instance, Godby et al. (1997) 
experimentally test the consequences of introducing futures in emission permits markets – as we will refer below 
– and Unold and Requate (2001) study the impact of combining an emission trading system with a call options 
menu. The effects of this type of instrument,, very common in financial markets, are still not very clear for 
emission permits markets. Therefore, it is an area for further research. 
8
 When borrowing is allowed a firm might pollute more than its current limit but compensate that emission 
permits deficit in a future period, before the end of the control period. 
9
 For example, SO2 EPA’s emission trading program already allowed banking of permits. 
10
 Some of these studies also treated simultaneously some of the market failures we mentioned. Hagem and 
Holtsmark (1998), for example, studied the consequences of having a system with bankable permits and a 
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Kling and Rubin (1997) criticize Rubin’s (1996) work as it did not include the social 
regulator’s problem and the optimality of bankable permits. These authors highlight the fact 
that even if intertemporal transaction of permits may minimize firms’ total abatement costs 
this does not necessarily mean that the solution will be the social optimum. This may be true 
if total social damages are higher when pollutant emissions are moved in time (in other words, 
when the timing of emissions affects total social damages) In sum, Kling and Rubin’s (1997) 
main contribution was to evaluate efficiency properties of an intertemporal emissions trading 
scheme from the society and the private firms perspectives. They found that in many cases the 
private solution was not the same as the social one, for that reason Kling and Rubin (1997) 
suggested that the intertemporal trade of emission permits should not be made on a case by 
case but instead it should rely on an appropriate rate of discount. This discount rate could be 
smaller or bigger then the interest rate of the market but would allow the private and social 
solutions to converge, assuming that social damages are constant and linear. This was also 
Yates and Cronshaw’s (2001) conclusion about social discount rate cost minimization, even 
in a different scenario considering asymmetric information regarding abatement costs 
between regulator and private firms.  
Yates and Cronshaw (2001) also concluded there were certain situations where 
intertemporal emission permits trading increased social welfare but this result was not 
universal. The authors show that the critical parameters for determining the answer to the 
question “to allow or not intertemporal emission permits trading” are the slopes of the 
marginal abatement costs and marginal damage curves11. In sum, Yates and Cronshaw’s 
(2001) conclude that before implementing an emissions trading program with intertemporal 
substitution careful attention should be given to the abatement cost and damage functions, as 
well as to the nature of the informational asymmetry. Therefore, they recommend no 
generalizations in this field, and a case-by-case analysis in order to find the correct answer for 
each case. 
Leiby and Rubin (2001) and Stevens and Rose (2002) develop models to evaluate the 
consequences of banking and borrowing emission permits in an international market, 
                                                                                                                                                        
dominant firm, with market power. His conclusion was that allowing banking and borrowing in these conditions 
would not originate the best result. 
On the sixth section of this paper we will refer to Innes (2003) study, and this relates intertemporal trading of 
emission permits with firms decision on whether to comply or to violate emissions limits imposed by the 
regulator. 
11
 As we will see bellow, this is a similar conclusion to that of Weitzman (1974). However, it does not even 
respect to the same problem as Yates and Cronshaw (2001) model was about firms’ behaviour in an emission 
permits market, which would not be the same if the policy instrument chosen was a different one. And Weitzman 
(1974) model respects to the comparison between different environmental instruments, namely price or quantity 
ones.  
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particularly reflecting Kyoto’s Protocol conditions12. Although the authors use different 
models, they both look for the correct rate of intertemporal transaction in this situation. 
However, Leiby and Rubin (2001) and Stevens and Rose (2002) find different results’ 
regarding the consequences of non-unitary emission permits intertemporal trade. Leiby and 
Rubin (2001) conclude that if the discount rate is correctly determined banking and borrowing 
generate greater efficiency gains, while Stevens and Rose (2002) argue the net gains that 
could be achieved are very small. The explanation for this divergence might in fact be related 
to the differences in the models used.  
On this matter there are a few experimental studies. Muller and Mestelman (1998), for 
example, argue in favour of the implementation of intertemporal trade of emission permits 
based on some of the results in experimental studies. 
However, different experimental studies don’t reach the same results. While Godby et 
al. (1997) find that the introduction of bankable coupons and shares would result in increased 
efficiency, Muller and Mestelman (1994) conclude the opposite. This disparity may be 
explained by the fact that these authors used very different market institutions and this, as we 
have seen at the beginning of this paper, has influence on the final result. And more 
importantly, Muller and Mestelman (1994) did not introduce uncertainty in their experiments 
in the same fashion as Godby et al. (1997). Therefore, these experiences are not comparable.  
Godby et al. (1997) lab experiment assumed an uncertain context and the results show 
that price instability although present it almost disappears with the introduction of bankable 
coupons and shares. Consequently efficiency in emission permits market significantly 
increases even with a much more complex environment for decision-making. However, 
Godby et al. (1997) could not explain these results nor economic theory predicts them. So, 
this remains an open field for investigation.  
Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse (1999) also use lab experiments to study the 
consequences of intertemporal trading of emission permits, but for the specific case of the 
market institution used by the EPA’s SO2 market proposal. Although bankable titles increase 
the complexity of the market, Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse (1999) conclude that the market 
institution proposed by EPA could achieve efficiency gains by adding intertemporal trade. 
Although this is not an experiment comparable to that of Godby et al. (1997), as it was 
conceived in a context of certainty, it also brings arguments in favour of the introduction of 
bankable coupons.  
                                                 
12
 Stevens and Rose (2002) also aim to evaluate Kyoto’s flexible mechanisms (CDM and JI) potential for 
abatement cost reduction. And according to these authors simulation model this mechanisms may effectively 
bring additional efficiency gains. 
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A totally different question about uncertainty consists of evaluating the robustness of 
the advantages of emission permits market in comparison to all the alternative instruments, in 
an uncertainty context. Weitzman (1974) is the first study on this matter and his conclusions 
are the following: the original absolute advantage of an emission permits market (from Dales’ 
(1968) or Montgomery’s (1972) papers) does not hold in the presence of uncertainty. 
Weitzman’s (1974) conclusion on the efficiency of price (ex. taxes) vs quantity (ex. emission 
permits market) instruments, under uncertainty, is that it depended on the slope of the cost 
and benefit curves at the optimal output level. In sum, emission permits market could no 
longer be considered the policy instrument since its superiority depends on several 
parameters.  
Weitzman (1974) argues that under uncertainty the best policy instrument is the one 
that has a higher probability of avoiding a big error relative to the environmental limit 
imposed. Thus, under uncertainty, if marginal benefits are more sensitive to the control level a 
quantity restriction is preferred but if marginal costs change faster than marginal benefits, a 
price instrument is advisable.  
Stavins (1996) and Newell and Stavins (2003), for example, develop Weitzman’ s 
(1974) model to make it applicable to other situations. Stavins (1996) includes simultaneous 
and correlated uncertainty with respect to costs and benefits of pollution abatement, and not in 
separate as Weitzman (1974) and concludes that only the uncertainty about abatement costs is 
relevant to the choice of a instrument policy. Moreover, Stavins (1996) shows that 
Weitzman’s (1974) rule about the relative slopes of marginal abatement cost and benefit 
curves could not be applied when simultaneous and correlated uncertainty on costs and 
benefits exists. He even concludes the rule was totally reversed in this case. Newell et al. 
(2003), on the other hand, introduce the necessary changes to Weitzman’s (1974) model in 
order to apply it specifically to the case of stock pollutants, and the problem of uncertainty 
about its costs of abatement. These authors’ analysis is dynamic, and not static as Weitzman’s 
(1974), allowing them to address the problem of global climatic changes due to greenhouse 
gases concentration. Even with the several adjustments made by Newell and Stavins (2003), 
these authors found the same rule as Weitzman (1974) for the choice of the best 
environmental policy instrument. Moreover for the environmental policies concerning 
greenhouse gases they conclude that price instruments should be chosen since they allow 
higher welfare gains than quantity instruments. 
Newell and Stavins’ (2003) have important implications in the current debate over 
Climate Change. International CO2 emissions trading markets predicted in the Kyoto 
Protocol, or the recently created European market, are examples of the choice of a quantity 
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instrument for a pollutant that Newell and Stavins (2003) considered should be treated with a 
mixed instrument including price and quantity instruments13. 
Weitzman himself (Weitzman (1978)) and Roberts and Spence (1976) had already 
made this suggestion for the use of mix or hybrid mechanisms. Weitzman (1978) develops 
precedent work and concludes that price and quantity instruments should not be regarded as 
separate instruments.  On the opposite, the optimal solution would pass by a mixed system, 
with the relative advantages of each instrument being those he presented in his 1974 paper. 
Roberts and Spence (1976) also studies the advantages and problems associated with the price 
and quantity instruments and corroborated Weitzman (1974) rule. Roberts and Spence (1976) 
also confirms the same result in favour of using a mixed policy scheme. The argument 
presented was that if the regulators’ objective was to limit pollutant emissions, a quantitative 
restriction could be imposed through the cap on tradable emission permits. But, if abatement 
costs revealed to have been overvalued, an additional incentive for abatement might be 
necessary, and this could be a subsidy. If, on the other hand, abatement costs come to be too 
high a safety valve would be necessary, through a penalty for exceeding emissions imposed 
by the quantitative restriction. The same proposal is advocated in Jacoby and Ellerman’s 
(2004).14 
However, there is a different between the theoretically correct policy choice and the 
real world political choice. The Kyoto Protocol used a quantity instrument to control 
emissions instead of using a price instrument, which given the specific characteristics of the 
environmental problem is the theoretically adequate instrument. To solve this incompatibility 
between economic policy recommendation and politic agreements, Jacoby and Ellerman 
(2004) suggest at least a safety valve should be adopted, which combines price instrument 
superiority for stock pollutants with the seemingly politically more attractive quantitative 
instrument. To limit the probability of imposing a quantitative restriction, in a cap-and-trade 
system, which imposes costs well above the benefits of abatement, a price should be 
established to work as a safety valve, getting close to the avoided marginal damages15. 
                                                 
13
 Aldy et al. (2003) critical study about Kyoto Protocol (and thirteen other policy alternatives presented by 
different authors to the global climate change problem) reached a similar conclusion. Price mechanisms should 
be the key element of the approaches based on the market to the solution of this type of problem. And if it was 
not possible to directly tax emissions, these authors suggested hybrid schemes with quotas and taxes.   
14
 Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) work comes in line with Weitzman’s (1974) and starts by confirming his results. 
Then, they exemplify with different situations the key parameters for the choice of the correct policy instrument. 
And for the GHG combat policies, Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) show that price instruments are the most 
appropriate. Climatic damages are expected to increase with GHG concentration but each period emissions are 
just a small contribution for the existent stock pollutant. Therefore, single period additional emissions marginal 
damages are almost constant and the bigger uncertainty is on marginal abatement costs. This situation  is the case 
for a price instrument to be adopted. 
15
 However, criticisms exist about the consequences of implementing this safety valve. Namely, environmental 
groups consider it might diminish the quantitative restriction on pollutant emissions and consequently decrease 
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Mandell (2004a) considers this hybrid mechanisms are seldom used because of the 
complexity for its implementation. Therefore, he recommends that some polluters should 
have their emissions taxed and others should be included in a cap-and-trade mechanism, 
instead of using the two instruments simultaneously for the same group of firms. Based on the 
results obtained, Mandell (2004a) concludes that dividing the regulated firms in two groups 
brings efficiency gains due to the decrease in emission permits market distortions, which are 
higher than the efficiency losses created by the ineffective regulated sector’s division (that do 
not equalizes marginal abatement costs, those subject to a price mechanism).  
Furthermore, instead of a fixed price for the safety valve, Mandell (2004b) develops a 
regulatory mechanism that includes a price function with positive slope, which means there is 
the possibility of price increases with the number of permits issued. Compared with the 
performance of the other instruments, under uncertainty about marginal abatement costs, this 
generalized hybrid mechanism revealed to be the best.    
We should, however recall that this and all the studies we referred, from Weitzman 
(1974) on, did not include the developments suggested for emission permits markets we 
pointed above in this section. Namely, none considered the intertemporal trading possibility, 
of using bankable coupons, which could make this quantity instrument more flexible and 
efficient. This is a modification that should be made in the future in order to verify if the 
conclusions on the superiority of price instruments for GHG emissions abatement would still 
hold. Recommendations for the international environmental policy responsible would depend 
on the results of that potential investigation. 
 
6. IMPERFECT COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
Emission permits market equilibrium and market outcomes are usually determined under the 
assumption that firms comply with the environmental limits imposed by regulators. 
Consequently, predicted results for the use of this policy instrument assume this hypothesis of 
perfect compliance and enforcement. However, in reality, violations of environmental limits 
occur and regulators face difficulties concerning enforcement, as they have scarce budgets to 
pay for the control and monitor costs16. Therefore, it is important to know whether the 
                                                                                                                                                        
the environmental quality established by the quantity instrument. This and other arguments against the use of the 
safety valve are described on Jacoby’s et al. (2004) paper. 
16
 Aldy et al. (2003) and Barret and Stavins (2003), for example, express their concern about Kyoto Protocol 
mechanisms capacity, as well as the alternative proposals for an international climatic policy, to induce the 
correct level of participation and compliance. These two studies consider these policies did not properly cared 
about this aspect and Barret and Stavins (2003) even suggests some incentives that could be introduced in these 
international agreements in order to overcome this failure. They recognize, however, the difficulties in their 
implementation, as the parts are sovereign countries.  
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efficiency gains from using emission permits market still hold under imperfect compliance 
and monitoring. This section reviews studies on this question.   
Malik (1990) shows that when firms violate the environmental limits imposed, 
emission permits market do not result in the minimization of abatement costs. In other words, 
in the presence of this market failure, emission permits market is not efficient. The emission 
permits demand from a noncompliant firm depends, according to Malik (1990), on its attitude 
towards risk as well as the regulator enforcement policy.  Therefore, emission permits price is 
also going to depend on these two factors.  
Malik (1990) concludes that the relationship between compliant and noncompliant 
firms emission permits demand depends on the characteristics of the compliance audit 
probability function considered by firms. This is something already considered by Beavis and 
Walker (1983a) and Beavis and Walker (1983b) previous models. Stochastic pollutant 
emissions abatement decisions by firms were made considering the information they had on 
what they knew to be the regulator’s imperfect information on their disposal and the 
monitoring frequency. For a given penalty function, these authors conclude that the way and 
frequency of regulators monitoring influences the firms pollutant discharges, and violation 
levels. Regulator should therefore, simultaneously chose emission permits level to put in the 
market as well as the monitoring rate.  
Malik (1990) highlights the relation between non-compliance, monitoring, penalty 
parameters and equilibrium permits price and the importance it should have at the moment of 
design and implementation of an emission permits market. These are aspects not originally 
taken into account when considering the adoption of this environmental policy instrument. 
However Malik (1990) demonstrates they effectively cannot be ignored. 
Keeler (1991) work comes as a continuity of Malik’s (1990) but his objective is 
somewhat different. Keeler (1991) compared emission permits market performance with a 
command-and-control instrument (a standard) when compliance is not perfect. The 
motivation was to evaluate if the superiority usually attributed to the market-based 
mechanism was still true under this circumstances. Keeler (1991) focus on the penalty 
function, as a critical factor for the final results of an emission permits market. He concludes 
that emission permits market was not always more efficient than the standard, the result 
depends on the type of penalty function used (constant, increasing or decreasing). 
Keeler (1991) used equal monitoring probabilities and penalty functions for all firms 
but considers that it should be tested whether different regulating efforts towards firms with 
different abatement costs matter for market outcomes. Keeler (1991) assumes that high 
abatement costs can be taken as synonymous of higher violation probability, so the regulator 
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should direct more monitoring efforts towards this type of firms. However, Stranlund and 
Dhanda (1999) conclusions show there is no need for regulators to apply different resources 
on firms with different abatement costs to increase compliance. 
Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) objective was slightly different from the precedent 
studies. Assuming an emission permits market with noncompliant firms, the authors try to 
understand in which way regulators should apply their limited budget to monitoring and to 
penalties over heterogeneous, noncompliant firms in order to enforce the specified 
environmental objective.  
Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) model consisted of a competitive emission permits 
market, with price-takers, risk neutral and heterogeneous firms. They assume that emissions 
are grandfathered and that the competitive market would establish a constant price for 
permits. Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) wanted to evaluate the probability of regulators’ 
monitoring and penalty strategies affecting the market equilibrium and, consequently, firms’ 
equilibrium compliance choices. Therefore, the authors model different possibilities of audit 
probability, as well as different announced penalty structures. They focused, however, on the 
case of increasing penalties for increasing firms’ violation rates. This is the main difference 
between Malik (1990) and Keeler (1991) studies: to explicitly deal with penalty and control 
system design for an emission permits trading market.  
Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) results surprisingly show firms’ decisions on emission 
levels, and violations, are independent both of audit probabilities and penalty function. There 
is, however, an indirect price effect of the regulator’s policy on equilibrium emissions level 
and violations and consequently on firms’ emission levels (through permits’ price). Moreover, 
compliance or violation decisions are independent of firms’ own exogenous characteristics. In 
other words, for constant monitoring and penalty functions, a variation on firms’ parameters 
affecting their abatement costs has no influence on their decision on violation or compliance 
with the environmental limit. Two different firms, one using a more pollutant productive 
technology than the other, facing the same monitoring probability and the same penalty 
function will present the same level of compliance or violation17. Therefore, Stranlund and 
Dhanda (1999) refer that the reason for different compliance behaviour between different 
firms must be the difference in monitoring and penalty efforts from the regulator. Equilibrium 
violations are not, however, completely independent of firms’ exogenous characteristics 
                                                 
17
 Each firm chooses its emission level to make its marginal abatements costs equal to market emission permits 
price. It also chooses the number of permits to hold in such a way marginal expected penalty equals again 
emission permits price. Consequently, as all firms face the same emission permits price, they all have the same 
marginal abatement costs and marginal expected penalties, whatever the regulator’s strategy is.  
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because there is an indirect price effect: these firms’ characteristics affect emission permits 
demand and consequently emission permits equilibrium price and violations.  
Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) conclude that different monitoring and penalty functions 
applied by the regulator to different firms, determined from an optimal program of monitoring 
and issuing penalties, are independent of firms’ exogenous characteristics. Therefore, in order 
to decide how and where to apply its scarce enforcement resources the regulator cannot use 
those characteristics. Yet, this same authors refer these theoretical results should be 
empirically tested but rigorous econometric tests are not possible because there is not enough 
data. In this case, they consider that the experimental methodology could give a good 
contribution for the test of these results18.  
Other studies have been conducted to simultaneously evaluate the performance of the 
emission permits market policy in the presence of two market failures: imperfect compliance 
and enforcement, and marker power19. van Egteren and Weber (1996), for example, base their 
work on Hahn’s (1984) model for market power and Malik’s (1990) model for imperfect 
compliance and enforcement . With the combination of these two models, van Egteren and 
Weber (1996) try to determine the impact of market power on emission permits equilibrium 
price and on firms’ compliance level. They find that when market power is present, initial 
allocation of permits plays a very important role on market’s final result, both concerning 
emission permits price and firms’ compliance levels. Lower initial allocation of permits to the 
firm with market power increases compliance levels of the competitive fringe firms but 
reduces compliance level of the dominant firm. In this case, van Egteren and Weber (1996) 
suggest that monitoring and penalty efforts should be concentrated on the dominant firm. In 
sum, they suggest that the initial allocation of permits may be used to control both market 
power and the regulators‘ enforcement policy effectiveness.  
Malik (2002) work comes in the same line as van Egteren and Weber (1996) but 
reaches different conclusions. Malik (2002) considers that some non-compliance might be 
socially desirable because it diminishes market power distortions. This might be so if the 
fringe competitive firms are the ones violating the environmental objective and their permits 
demand becomes more price elastic. As the dominant firm decides to exert its market power, 
competitive non-compliant firms reduce the dominant firm’s market power and the 
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 This work has been partially done by Murphy and Stranlund (2004 and 2005) that confirm Stranlund and 
Dhanda (1999) results. 
19
 We will refer with some detail to studies that consider this two market failures. However, non-compliance 
problem has been studied together with other failures, different from market power. Rousseau and Proost (2004), 
for example, use a second-best general equilibrium model to study different environmental policy instruments 
efficiency when previous to environmental regulation distortions exist, like labour taxes, and there is also some 
non-compliance of the environmental limits imposed. We will not consider this type of studies here but the 
ranking of this policy instruments changes when non-compliance possibility is included.  
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differences between their marginal profits. Although Malik (2002) concludes there are social 
benefits associated with the non-compliance behaviour he refers that those benefits must be 
compared with the social costs, i.e., costs associated with a higher level of pollutant 
emissions. In sum, Malik (2002) argues in favour of a second-best solution since it is not 
socially optimal to eliminate one of the market failures without correcting the other.  
In the precedent studies compliance was assumed as a choice variable within the 
model. Chavez and Stranlund (2003) assumes that compliance is exogenous and analyses 
whether the regulators’ decisions regarding the enforcement of a cap in an emission permits 
market varies with the existence of a dominant firm and how it varies with the method used 
for the initial allocation of emission permits. 
Chavez and Stranlund (2003) conclude fringe competitive firms and the dominant firm 
should be controlled differently, and according to their position in the market – either 
emission permits buyer or seller. Moreover, firms’ abatement and compliance costs can be at 
the efficient level if the dominant firm chooses to enter in the emission permits market. This 
conclusion is opposite to the one in Hahn’s (1984). Additionally, market power may be 
explored to diminish total costs of an emissions trading program implying that market power 
should not be regarded as always undesirable, on a case by case basis the efficiency loss from 
the exercise of market power should be compared with the reduction in enforcement costs 
possible by the exercise of that market power.  Regarding the method for the initial allocation 
of permits, the efficient allocation of permits may be one that implies the participation of the 
dominant firm participation in the market, which means that the final result will not equalize 
marginal abatement costs across firms. As Chavez and Stranlund (2003) underline this 
conclusion has an important implication for empirical analysis on the efficiency of the 
market: when compliance and enforcement costs are considered efficiency is no longer a 
marginal costs equalization matter.  
However, the implementation of Chavez and Stranlund (2003) recommendations is 
difficult since it requires knowledge of firms’ marginal abatement costs thus, regulators might 
be more tempted to limit market power than to adjust initial allocation of permits in the way 
suggested20.  
Either in competitive or monopolistic markets, the enforcement and monitoring of 
emission reduction is still a problem for the regulator. Several studies have analysed this 
problem in the context of an international GHG emissions market. Werksman (1999), Mullins 
(1999) and Baron (1999), for example, consider the enforcement problem for global climate 
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 In this situation, distributing permits using an auction is usually recommended. Chavez and Stranlund. (2003) 
refer that it has not yet been evaluated enforcement costs of grandfathered and auctioned permits, and consider it 
is a necessary work in the future.  
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change policies as proposed by the Kyoto protocol. To penalize each non-compliant country 
is a complex and expensive task. Therefore, an alternative enforcement rule appears in these 
studies: the buyer responsibility rule. In other words, if the emission permits seller does not 
abate the corresponding emissions, the buyer is not allowed to use the bought titles. Emission 
permits buyers have, in this case, all the interest in buying permits to the most trustable 
entities in the market. 
However, if the buyer responsibility rule may solve the non-compliance risk it may 
also involve high transaction costs, reduced liquidity in the market, and it may be a complex 
rule to implement. Cason (2003) experimental study evaluates the benefits of using this rule, 
in terms of the incentives it brings to compliance of the environmental limits imposed. The 
experimental results show that seller of emission permits invest on the guarantee of its permits 
(i. e, insures himself against non-compliant buyers), increasing in this way the efficiency in 
the market, and that buyers are willing to pay a prize for trustable permits. Therefore, 
emission permits would be sold at different market prices, because these would reflect the 
non-compliance risk. Furthermore these market prices would effectively constitute an 
incentive for sellers to comply with their emission abatement limits. Cason (2003) experiment 
is the only we are aware of that addresses this issue, which means tests on the robustness of 
its results are in order. Moreover, Cason (2003) refer some extensions should be done to this 
work, and some simplifying assumptions should be relaxed in order to make the conclusions 
obtained more useful in practice.  
Cason and Gangadharan (2005) experiment’s studies the interaction between three 
pertinent questions in emission permits markets: uncertainty, banking and compliance and 
enforcement. Although other experimental studies have already analysed all those questions, 
this is the first to address them simultaneously.  
The results Cason and Gangadharan (2005) show that banking decreases emission 
permits price volatility but reduces compliance and, consequently, increases emission levels.21 
This result has no explanation in economic theory and thus future investigation on this matter 
is necessary. Innes (2003) evaluates the impact of banking under uncertainty and found 
another argument in favour of the intertemporal substitution of permits: to increase emission 
permits market efficiency through reduction of enforcement costs. Therefore, to find out the 
compliance incentives, in the presence of banking, is still a research objective for the future. 
                                                 
21
 Although even without banking, non-compliance of environmental limits exists, the participants in this 
experiment chose to violate more frequently when they could use their titles in future periods. Apparently, these 
subjects considered having more benefits with non-compliance when they could sell banked permits in 
subsequent periods. Innes (2003) found the opposite result. 
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To conclude this section despite the diversity of results, it is clear that imperfect 
enforcement and non-compliance behaviour influence emission permits market efficiency. 
However, the best strategy for the regulator in this situation as well as other depends on 
characteristics of the market institution that are not yet consensual.  
 
7. INCENTIVES TO INNOVATION 
In the previous sections we analysed how emission permits market outcomes are affected by a 
series of market failures in the sense that they represent circumstances where the assumption 
of Dales (1968) original model are not met. In this section we analyse one of the advantages 
attributed to this policy instrument, which is its ability to promote innovation, and 
consequently contribute to attainment of dynamic efficiency.  
Even if environmental regulation, of any kind, usually obliges firms to adopt 
procedures that they otherwise would not adopt, the choice for emission tradable permits was 
originally assumed to be the one that was capable of inducing a higher level of technological 
innovation. Emission permits was the market-based policy instrument considered to originate 
the best result concerning dynamic efficiency. Command-and-control policy instruments 
were, on the contrary, referred as the least efficient, especially when consisting of the 
imposition of a standard technology of abatement. In this case, firms had no incentives to 
innovate and introduce new ones. 
In theory there is no ranking of environmental policy instruments regarding their effect 
on technological innovation. And, what is more troubling, some of the studies do not find 
emission permits markets to be at the top of the list. Jaffe et al. (2002) describe various 
studies on environmental policy evaluation concerning dynamic efficiency to try to conclude 
about emission permits market advantage. They suggest that obviously different 
environmental policy instruments might have different impacts on technological innovation. 
Therefore, the design and evaluation of environmental policies should consider technological 
development as an endogenous variable and not exogenous as frequently happens. In fact, 
Tietenberg (1985) considered this to be one of the major factors responsible for the 
differences between expected results and real outcomes from the implementation of emission 
permits markets. 
Since Magat (1978), numerous studies have evaluated the differences across 
environmental policy instruments concerning their ability to induce technological innovation. 
Downing and White. (1986), Malueg (1989), Carraro and Siniscalco. (1994), Biglaiser et al. 
(1995), Jung et al  (1996), Parry (1998), Requate (1998), Keohane (1999), Montero (2002) 
and Fischer et al.  (2003) are some of the references in this subject.  
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Although differing in many aspects of their analysis several of these studies positioned 
the instruments in the following order with respect to efficiency. First, auctioned emission 
permits; second, taxes and subsidies on emissions; third grandfathered emission permits; and 
fourth, performance standards. Accepting the order it should be stressed that grandfathered 
emission permits is the worst positioned instrument based on the market. This result is 
important because grandfathering has generally been the method chosen for emission permits 
initial allocation. Further, the initial distribution of emission permits is not irrelevant for the 
final results with respect to the dynamic efficiency of the market. Consequently, Dales’s 
(1968) or Montgomery’s (1972) argument that initial permits distribution was irrelevant for 
efficiency of the market, with impacts just on equity, is contradicted. Auctioned permits seem 
to bring higher incentives to technological innovation than grandfathered permits, in several 
studies22.  
Malueg’s (1989) conclusions, on the other hand, are even more troubling than the one 
we just mentioned. He concludes that emission permits markets might reduce firms’ 
incentives to innovate, which is totally opposite to the advantages originally attributed to this 
environmental policy. Incentives to innovation from command-and-control instruments 
comparatively to emission permits market explicitly depend on the position of the firm in this 
market, before and after the adoption of the new technology. Malueg (1989) shows that if the 
firm is a buyer in the emission permits market before and after the new technology adoption, 
the incentives for new technology adoption are lower than if an environmental standard was 
adopted. He justifies this result with the fact that emission permits market gives a relatively 
cheap option to comply with the emissions abatement imposed, which reduces its benefits and 
need to adopt a new technology. Therefore, according to Malueg (1989) it is not true emission 
permits markets have an absolute advantage over the command-and-control policy 
instruments with respect to its incentives to innovation. 
Fischer et al.  (2003), for example, included technological innovation as an 
endogenous variable of environmental policies and found that there was no clear ordering of 
the environmental policy instruments since the incentives to innovate depend on the costs of 
innovation, the environmental damage function, the capacity of the innovating firm to 
appropriate the effects of innovation on the other firms, and also depends on the number of 
pollutant firms. 
Montero (2002) considers imperfect competition in the permit and product markets 
and finds result totally opposite to economic literature: command-and-control instruments 
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 Not all agree with the same ranking of the different instruments. Keohane (1999), for instance, argues 
auctioned permits do not cause more induced technological innovation than grandfathered permits.  
 31
such as environmental standards may provide higher incentives to innovation than tradable 
emission permits. Montero (2002) explained this conclusion as a result of the combination of 
two effects: a direct effect of cost minimization, and a strategic effect. For environmental 
standards, the strategic effect is always positive as R&D firms’ investment diminishes its own 
costs but not its rivals, which increases its output and profits. For emission permits, on the 
other hand, R&D investments cause external impacts on the market, which can reduce firm’s 
rival costs. As R&D diminishes emission permits prices this strategic effect is positive for 
permits buyers but negative for permits sellers. In sum, Montero (2002) finds the same result 
as Malueg (1989), emission permits markets have no absolute advantage comparatively to 
environmental standards, with respect to induced technological changes, but this result 
depends on whether firms are buyers or sellers of emission permits. 
Laffont and Tirole (1996) focused their attention only on emission permits markets 
incentives to technological innovation and not on its comparison to other policy instruments. 
The main conclusion was that emission permits markets do not produce incentives for an 
efficient level of innovation23. Laffont and  Tirole (1996) suggest firms invest too much in 
new technologies, comparatively with the optimal level, because they do not internalise the 
revenue losse imposed on other firms when they do not enter in the emission permits market. 
As originally conceived, these markets would not induce the correct level of innovation so 
Laffont and Tirole. (1996) propose some changes, such as the introduction of a futures 
market.24 They also studied the regulator’s ability to influence firms’ decisions regarding 
R&D investment through the level of emission permits issued. The solution proposed 
however would harm the trust that firms pose in the market, due to the uncertainty caused by 
potential fluctuations on the volume of permits.  
Dowlatabadi (1998), Goulder et al. (1999) and Kemfert (2004) included technological 
changes as an endogenous variable of their models, in order to find what they considered a 
true value for the abatement costs of GHG like CO2. In this way, estimated impacts of global 
environmental policies would come closer to reality, as the main dynamics and interactions 
between socio-economic and natural systems were characterized. And as the inclusion of this 
endogenous variable resulted in smaller estimated costs of abatement of GHG, arguments in 
favour of international emission permits market creation are strengthened. 
Nicklisch and Zucchini’s (2005) experimental study explicitly considered the strategic 
trade off between investing in new abatement techniques and the emission permits price. The 
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 The question of achieving a socially optimal level of innovation was not under consideration in the studies 
referred before. 
24
 If the regulator sells, at the present moment, emission permits for the next period at smaller price than the one 
in the spot market, investment in innovation is discouraged.  
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objective was to test two different questions. First, to investigate whether theoretical 
equilibrium predictions would still hold when firms have two choice variables (emission 
permits quantity and abatement investments). Second, to study the strategies firms would 
chose to adjust to permit market quantities (imitative, collusive, competitive behaviour). They 
conclude that the market approached the Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, they concluded 
that agents generally adapt their emission permits demand imitating their successful rivals. 
These results also identify two spillover effects. The first, explicitly included in the market 
mechanism, is the fact that one firm investment causes a decrease in emission price. The 
second, reflecting the adaptation rules adopted by the majority of firms in this environment, 
concerns the fact that successful permits demand by one agent have a great probability of 
being imitated. Therefore, Nicklisch et al. (2005) conclude that an emission permits market 
with a competitive equilibrium will create, in the long run, a strong incentive for small 
investments in abatement technology.  
In experimental work the concern has been on static efficiency and not on dynamic 
efficiency. Therefore, this is obviously one field where much research is necessary because it 
is not totally clear, as theoretical studies we mentioned demonstrate, the dynamic efficiency 
characteristics of emission permits markets. If for a long time this was an absolute advantage 
associated to this policy instrument, presently the innovation induced by emission permits 
market is not unquestionable. However, consensus on this matter is yet to be found.  
 
8. CONCLUSION  
Economic models are a simplification of reality. No news in that, but one should keep it in 
mind while reviewing some of the criticisms to Dales (1968) original model for emission 
permits markets. It assumed perfect competition while it is obvious that such market structure 
is almost impossible to exist in practice. Thus, to question the announced efficiency of 
emission permits markets seems justifiable. 
As we have seen section 2 of this paper, transaction rules established for emission 
permits markets cannot be considered a mere detail since they influence the behaviour of 
market participants and, consequently, affect the market’s final outcome. Although there are 
opposite results concerning the capacity of market institutions to prevent or minimize some 
market failures identified in emission permits markets, it is by now consensual that its 
characteristics are not neutral with respect to the efficiency of this policy instrument. 
Experimental and field evidence has shown that the market institution chosen 
determines how close the final outcome will be to the competitive equilibrium. As we pointed 
out along this paper, the characteristics of the market institution also determine the transaction 
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costs and the uncertainty level firms have to face, their capacity to exercise market power, 
their compliance decisions, as well as firms’ innovation incentives. The method for the initial 
allocation of permits is singled out as an important regulator’s choice for the efficiency of the 
emission permits market, and that may influence, at higher or lower degree, the various 
aspects considered in the different sections of this paper. This is the first important conclusion 
we found from all the studies analysed: the initial distribution of permits not only has equity 
consequences, but also impacts on the efficiency of the market. Transaction costs and the 
exercise of market power are market failures that can be minimized if the correct initial 
allocation of permits is implemented, as first demonstrated by Stavins (1995) and Hahn 
(1984), respectively. 
The capacity of different market institutions to prevent the exercise of market power, 
identified as a problem in some emission permits markets, has been the subject of an 
extensive research. The double auction institution is maintained as the best choice when this 
market failure is present, but there are still some opposite results concerning the factual 
superiority of this market institution in such cases. Moreover, the very impact of imperfect 
competition on the efficiency of emission permits market does not show up as a serious 
problem in several studies. It depends on whether we are dealing with simple or exclusionary 
market power, which also means that the policy recommendations to deal with this market 
failure depend on the type of market power under consideration. However, even if the 
exercise of market power may not have severe consequences for the outcome of emission 
permits markets in a static framework, it certainly diminishes the dynamic efficiency of this 
policy instrument. Because market prices are not at the competitive level, they do not give the 
correct information necessary to induce the efficient level of technological innovation. 
Therefore, this advantage of emission permits markets comparatively to other policy 
instruments is reduced at best. 
As detailed in section 5 of the paper, several studies have proven that the consequence 
of uncertain marginal abatement costs or uncertain effective emissions is price volatility in the 
market. This distorts the information transmitted by prices and causes efficiency reductions, 
both in dynamic and static contexts. Alternate titles, concerning its validity date, and bankable 
titles, allowing its intertemporal substitutability, are two changes in the original emission 
permits design that have been suggested as a solution for this problem. These two title 
properties have been studied and their advantages identified. They are both capable of 
reducing the price volatility caused by uncertainty, but no generalization should be made for 
their use since the correct discount rate for intertemporal substitution, for example, depends 
on the parameters of marginal abatement costs and of marginal damage functions. 
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The most troubling conclusion we found concerning the consequences of uncertainty 
in emissions trading markets is that it may lose its efficiency advantages over other policy 
instruments, namely command-and-control ones. For the specific case of global climate 
change policies, it has been clearly demonstrated that, under uncertainty conditions, price 
instruments, like taxes, should be preferred to quantity instruments, like the ones 
recommended in the Kyoto Protocol. Grandfathered emission permits are the most affected by 
the presence of uncertainty, with its efficiency gains more reduced, which is worrying because 
it is the mostly used method for the initial allocation of permits. Suggestions to use a hybrid 
instrument have appeared in order to overcome the problem of having policy choices opposite 
to theoretical recommendations. Known as a safety valve, a price limit on emission permits 
close to avoided marginal damages should be set. However, the complexity of this hybrid 
instrument makes it difficult to be implemented and that is probably the reason why it has not 
yet been applied. 
The identification of imperfect compliance and enforcement of imposed 
environmental limits also shed some doubts on the advantages of emission permits market. As 
examined in section 6, this market failure implies that efficient results are not achieved with 
this policy instrument. Although the negative impact of imperfect compliance and 
enforcement for the efficiency of emission permits market has been recognized, the necessary 
changes to market institutions to deal with this problem have not yet been identified. Such an 
endeavour requires an understanding of the compliance incentives agents face in the presence 
of different characteristics of the market, and this is a research area where the experimental 
methodology can clearly make important contributions. 
Section 7 of the paper reviews various studies that question one of the main 
advantages always attributed to emission permits markets: to induce a higher level of 
innovation than any other environmental policy instrument. These studies demonstrate that 
this is not an effective absolute advantage of tradable emission permits over the other 
instruments, although no consensual ranking of the different environmental policy 
instruments was found. However, some consensus exists concerning the fact that the method 
chosen for the initial allocation of permits is not neutral with respect to innovation incentives. 
Again, the initial auctioning of permits instead of grandfathering is recommended on the 
grounds that it brings higher incentives to technological innovation. Section 7 also examines 
another question related to the emission permits market incentives to innovation, that is, the 
question of its dynamic efficiency. It has been argued that this must be considered an 
endogenous variable of the model, not an exogenous variable as it is usually considered. The 
studies we examined show that if this variable is endogenously included the estimated 
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emissions abatement costs are smaller than when technological innovation is considered an 
exogenous variable. Importantly, such a more accurate estimation brings further arguments in 
favour of policies to protect the environment. 
In summary, in this paper we address the main questions concerning the effective 
performance of emission permits markets under realistic circumstances, examining the most 
relevant studies on the subject. This work provides, therefore, a systematic vision of the 
problems regulators face with the implementation of this policy instrument. Every section of 
this paper points out the controversial results in the most important studies completed thus far 
and highlights the main issues yet to investigate. It becomes clear that Dales (1968) 
theoretical market for emission permits transaction is far from the cumbersome reality faced 
when implementing this policy instrument, and several changes are necessary to adapt this 
model to reality. 
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